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Comparing Exchange Market Pressure in West and Southern African Countries
1 
José Mário Lopes and Fábio Santos 
1. Introduction 
This paper is part of a NBER project described in Macedo and Pereira (2009) which 
assesses the extent to which Cape Verde and Mozambique should be perceived as successful 
development cases in Africa and the extent to which this is due to a positive interaction between 
globalization and governance in the orientation and predictability of economic policies. The 
institutional context is provided by cooperation agreements to which Cape Verde and 
Mozambique belong, notably in their corresponding sub regions, West and Southern Africa 
respectively. Specifically, Macedo and Pereira (2009) define policy regimes according to the 
combination of convergence to the income frontier and export diversification and compare 
regimes across both sub regions, concluding that ECOWAS countries are becoming more 
diversified whilst SADC countries are becoming more specialized. Opening up to trade is an 
important driver of convergence and diversification for ECOWAS. In SADC, the driver of 
convergence is economic and political freedom. The project also includes comparisons of 
monetary financial aspects of the two economies. This is a topic which is commonly discarded 
for developing countries, namely in sub-Saharan Africa, perhaps even more so than the topic of 
export diversification and sophistication which is the contribution of Cabral and Veiga (2010) to 
the same project.  
It is sometimes argued that African economies are too separated from each other to give 
the financial channel between those economies any relevance at all. Moreover, the credit system 
in poor countries tends to be of less importance than in rich countries, which may also hinder 
the financial links between those economies. Instead we argue that, for some of the African 
countries, openness is already a relevant feature. Indeed, even in an economy not as open as one 
in the developed world, there is a positive institutional effect, through which monetary stability 
brings about credibility, and credibility may bring with it higher investment and growth. 
Furthermore, the stability of exchange market pressure, EMP, which we may understand as 
enhanced financial credibility, may have a positive effect on growth for those economies. It is 
this institutional feature we explain, both in a descriptive way and in an econometric framework. 
We conclude that Cape Verde has a high degree of financial credibility in all accounts and that 
Mozambique, although lagging Cape Verde, displays positive features about its financial 
                                                            
1 This is a revised version of the paper on “Financial Reputation and Development Successes in Africa” 
presented by the first author to the INOVA Seminar of November 13
th, 2009. We thank seminar 
participants for comments suggestions and João Silva for his assistance, with the usual caveat. 
  2credibility. The recent growth experiences of Cape Verde and Mozambique signal that these two 
countries are indeed cases of success in terms of growth performance.  
New estimates of EMP are presented so as to help identify whether and how Cape 
Verde and Mozambique stand out relative to their partners in ECOWAS and SADC. The 
numeraire is taken to be the euro for ECOWAS - where a number of currencies have adopted 
the Franc CFA as described in Macedo (1986) - and the dollar for SADC. This paper uses as 
motivation and draws on the methodology used by Macedo et al. (2009) for the five Portuguese 
speaking countries (PALOP). Accordingly, the data for São Tomé e Príncipe, located in central 
Africa, is found in Country Appendix 16, between ECOWAS and SADC member countries. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the EMP variable, section 3 discusses the 
main findings one can infer from the simple descriptive analysis of the two growth experiences 
and from the inspection of the descriptive statistics for EMP, section 4 presents the model and 
the estimation techniques and section 5 discusses the results of the model, including the 
conditional mean and standard deviations derived from the model. Subsections from sections 3 
through 5 present evidence first for PALOP, then for ECOWAS (basic data in Country 
Appendix 1 through 15) and then for SADC (basic data in Country Appendix 17 through 30). 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. Measuring EMP 
We can find in the literature two ways of computing Exchange Market Pressure (EMP). 
Following Girton and Roper (1977), EMP can be computed as a weighted sum of the 
depreciation rate and of the foreign reserves changes, where these weights are computed from a 
structural open economy monetary model. Weymark (1998) follows this line of reasoning. 
A model-independent way of estimating EMP was designed by Eichengreen et al. 
(1996), who compute EMP as a weighted sum of the depreciation rate, foreign reserves change 
and changes in the interest rate differential, ie 
) (
*
t t i t r t t i i r e EMP           
where the weights for reserves r and for the interest rate differential   
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) ( / ) ( t t r r stdev e stdev       
)) ( ( / ) (
*
t t t i i i stdev e stdev       
These weights are designed to avoid that the most volatile components of EMP 
dominates the others. Their use has been criticized by Bertoli et al. (2006), who warn us for the 
  3ad hoc nature of this weighting scheme. As a benchmark, we computed a measure of EMP with 
equal weights and we recognize that this measure changes significantly. The broader definition, 
including the interest rate differential, is the standard in Eichengreen et al. (1996) as it contains 
more information. Nevertheless, we also computed the measure of EMP without the presence of 
the interest rate differential and the results are broadly similar
2. 
We associate low EMP with financial credibility: a financially credible economy will 
have a lower mean EMP with lower volatility and fewer “crises” (defined below as EMP 
exceeding the mean by more than 1.5 standard deviations). Following previous research by 
Macedo et al. (2009), our goal is to analyze EMP first in a descriptive sense and then in a 
model-dependent framework
3. Data, such as exchange rates, interest rates and foreign reserves 
(excluding gold) presented in the Country Appendixes was drawn mostly from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics. Domestic credit and CPI (necessary for the computation of 
the real exchange rate depreciation) were drawn from IFS and domestic sources (e.g, for Cape 
Verde, we drew domestic credit from the Central Bank’s webpage). Institutional variables were 
drawn from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, available on-line.
4 
3. Descriptive analysis 
3.1. The broader picture 
The growth performance of Cape Verde and Mozambique is described in Macedo and 
Pereira (2009, Figures 2a and 2b respectively) using the Maddison database on GDP per capita 
in PPP 1990 GK dollars and comparing it to the average for Sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, GDP 
per capita in Cape Verde reached above the ECOWAS average in the early eighties and has 
widened the gap since. We can also see that, institutionally, Cape Verde is sound when 
compared to other ECOWAS nations, now using the Worldwide Governance Indicators (for a 
reference on the WGI, see Kauffman et al (2009)). This is clear from Table 1a. This institutional 
portrait, however, misses the “financial credibility factor” which we start analyzing in the next 
section. As for Mozambique, it has had several hard years after independence, when 
undoubtedly the war has heavily hurt the economy, but has shown evident signs of catching-up. 
Indeed, after nearly thirty years below average, it surpassed SADC GDP per capita from 2002 
onwards. In institutional terms, using the Worldwide Governance Indicators, we see that 
                                                            
2 They are available from the authors upon request. 
3 Other useful references are Macedo et al. (2006a; 2006b; 2004 and 2003), the latter with the use of 
foreign exchange intervention data. 
4 For some of the countries in question, data was not available for the whole sample period. We were 
forced to use smaller sample periods than the whole decade for Zambia (October 2000 to December 
2006), Zimbabwe (January 1996 to December 2002), Madagascar (October 1999 to December 2006), 
Liberia (February 1997 to May 2006) and Guinea (October 1997 to December 2002) due to data 
constraints.  
  4Mozambique has a mixed record but behaves well in terms of political stability and voice and 
accountability compared to SADC countries (Table 1b). Figure 1 shows the tremendous 
improvements in Mozambique as soon the war is over, compared to SADC and Great Britain. 
Yet this misses the “financial credibility” factor, which is the focus of this paper. 
Before presenting the institutional and financial details deemed most relevant for these 
two economies, we compare their EMP to benchmarks for ECOWAS and SADC dating back to 
the late eighties / early nineties. Although our focus for both cases is the period between 1996 
and 2006, we will now draw on larger samples, dating back to 1989 and 1993 respectively. 
Given the lack of data for most of the other countries we also analyzed, we took specific 
countries in each region as representatives of the currency pegs and the currency floaters. 
Figures 2 and 3 show that, compared to Benin (a “pegger”) and Sierra Leone (a floater), Cape 
Verde has low EMP mean and volatility. Cape Verde has for a long time displayed sound 
institutions, reflected in a solid democratic culture and political stability as the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators tell us, but also good “macroeconomic governance”, which can be 
perceived by its historically low inflation rate by regional standards. Similarly, Mozambique 
compares well to South Africa, a floater, and Seychelles, a fixer (Figures 4 and 5). Nevertheless, 
particularly in terms of volatility, the Seychelles present a better behavior overall, which 
shouldn’t be surprising given that Seychelles is pegged to the dollar and also given that the 
Seychelles display good institutions as reported by the Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
Having analyzed the major trends in Cape Verde and Mozambique in the recent years, 
we present now a brief account of institutional details about the recent economic and financial 
history of Cape Verde and Mozambique, which will serve as a background for our estimations 
and results. 
In 1976, the Bank of Cape Verde started to operate fully, succeeding to the “Banco 
Nacional Ultramarino” and the “Banco de Fomento Nacional”. A peg with the Portuguese 
Escudo was in place. However, in 1977, following a devaluation of the Portuguese Escudo, the 
Cape Verdean Government decided to start pegging to a basket of currencies. During the 
eighties, several reforms were put in place, namely informatization of the central services, a 
significant spreading of the banking network throughout the country and the creation of an 
Investment Department by the Government that managed programs of support to the productive 
activities. From 1988 on, a vast program of reforms began promoting trade liberalization and 
privatizations leaving the government’s role mainly devoted to the building up of 
infrastructures. The successive governments in Cape Verde have made it their goal to continue 
these sets of reforms. Also, an increasing concern with the role of education and good 
governance indicators have led Cape Verde to several high growth years, much of which 
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In fact, by 1980 Cape Verde already depended significantly on the services sector. 
It was only in 1990 that a new Law was passed, that reinforced the central banking 
activity of the Bank, ie the monetary and exchange rate policies and its role as a lender of last 
resort. Commercial and development activities were still allowed, though, for some time. Until 
1993, the conditions were put in place for a complete loss of these roles by the Central Bank, 
which eventually happened in September 1993. All supervision was also laid in the hands of the 
Central Bank. Starting April 1st, 1998, the Cape Verde Escudo was fixed to the Euro. 
Institutionally and regarding the Millennium Development Goals, Cape Verde has also behaved 
well. To give an example, primary school enrolment is the highest in ECOWAS and child 
mortality is the lowest. 
Mozambique has also a success history, albeit more recent. The Metical was created in 
June, the 16th, 1980 by Law 2/80 and the colonial administration’s banknotes ceased to 
circulate. The first credit conceded by the International Development Association, though, was 
only granted in 1985; the second was in 1987 and successive agreements were signed in the 
following years. Mozambique has benefited widely of the support of the IDA, either financially, 
or through its technical expertise. The main accomplishments, as reported in IDA (2007), 
involve the liberalization of trade, financial sector reform (with a separation between the 
commercial and Central Banking functions of the Central Bank, with the introduction of 
competition in the commercial banking sector), improvement in health conditions, good 
investment climate and privatizations in several sectors.  In January, 31st, 1987, the Metical 
stopped being pegged to a basket of six currencies and started being pegged to the dollar. 
However, in April 1988, authorities reversed to a basket of ten currencies representative of the 
foreign goods and services transactions of Mozambique. 
In the late eighties/early nineties, policymakers started aiming at transforming 
Mozambique in a market economy. Throughout 1989, several capital account liberalization 
measures were pursued: agencies of the Bank were allowed to conduct foreign operations 
(April) and private financial firms were given more freedom to conduct foreign exchange 
operations (July). On November, 30, finally, the new Constitution declared that Mozambique 
would aim at being a market economy. 
In May 1993, interest rates were semi-liberalized and left to the free market, with the 
Central Bank determining maximum and minimum bounds. On June, exchange rates from the 
Secondary and Official Exchange Markets were unified. By 1994, the interest rates were 
completely liberalized. Through the following years, several liberalizing measures were 
undertaken and the legal foundations of the exchange market were perfected. 
  6In June 1999, in a move that was very important for Mozambique’s development, the 
external debt is pardoned in the amount of $ 3.7 billion, in an initiative know as HIPC5 
(Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, pushed forward by the IMF). Later, in 2000, a 
reinforced HIPC was put in place to the favour of Mozambique. In 2003, further measures were 
taken to ease capital operations by non-residents in the Stock Exchange. In fact, it has to be said 
that much of the development Mozambique is experiencing today would never have occurred 
had that debt relief not occurred in the early 2000’s (see African Economic Outlook 2008). 
                                                           
In 2005, the Central Bank started intervening in the Interbank Foreign Exchange Market 
through weekly auctions of foreign exchange. Also in 2005, a Multilateral Debt relief Initiative 
(MDRI) was launched to help achieve the MDG’s. In this respect, Mozambique has shown 




3.2. EMP in PALOP 
Following Macedo et al. (2009), we calculate the EMP mean and unconditional volatility per 
month, as well as the number of crises identified in the sample period, classified as low, 
moderate or high, depending on whether EMP exceeded the mean EMP by 1.5, 2.5 or 3.5 
standard deviations respectively. Table 2 presents EMP mean, unconditional volatility per 
month and the number of EMP crises in PALOP, 30 low crises and 12 moderate ones are 
recorded while Angola and Guinea-Bissau record two high crises. Cape Verde fares well in 
comparison to the other currency peg in the group of Portuguese-speaking countries (Guinea-
Bissau). This is noticeable both in terms of the level of the mean EMP and in terms of its 
volatility. Also, the number of crises may seem high but, actually, Cape Verde displays mostly 
low crises, whereas Guinea-Bissau has had two severe crises. Also, the behavior of Cape Verde 
during crises is much better than Guinea-Bissau’s. One should however, notice the good 
evolution in Guinea-Bissau since May 1997, the year in which Guinea-Bissau adopted the 
currency board.
7 Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the evolution throughout the sample period of the 
unconditional EMP mean and volatility of the currency pegs. 
 
5 The IMF outlines in its website the conditions under which a country is eligible to the HIPC: “To be 
considered for HIPC Initiative assistance, a country must: (1) be International Development Association-
only and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility-eligible; (2) face an unsustainable debt burden, beyond 
traditionally available debt-relief mechanisms; (3) establish a track record of reform and sound policies 
through IMF- and IDA-supported programs; and (4) have developed a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP) through a broad-based participatory process.” 
6 This section drew on information available in the webpages of the Bank of Mozambique and of the 
Bank of Cape Verde. 
7 We should notice that our sample is, for most countries, a full year larger in length than in Macedo et al. 
(2009), which ends in September 2005. Nevertheless, results are broadly in line, namely for the 
  7As for the managed floats (Mozambique, São Tomé and Angola), we can see in Table 2 
that Mozambique is the best both in terms of mean EMP and in terms of volatility, definitely 
outperforming Angola in most of the sample, even though in recent years Angola has shown a 
significant increase in credibility which we can trace by looking at the tremendous decrease in 
EMP and in volatility. We can also see from that table that Mozambique did not have severe 
crises, much to the contrary of Angola. Figures 8 and 9 display the evolution in the managed 
floats in our sample in terms of unconditional EMP mean and volatility, respectively. We can 
see how, from a high EMP and volatility Angola has converged to the situation in the other 
managed floats, where financial credibility seems to have been higher for some time. 
Nevertheless, the sheer comparison of both indicators in these floating regimes to their value in 
the currency pegs hints us that, in this sample period, at least for the Portuguese-speaking 
countries, “pegging” enhances financial credibility. 
Inspecting Figures 8 and 9, we can see that Angola’s EMP has been the highest but it 
has been falling across the sample period. We can also see that, among the Managed floats 
(Mozambique, Angola, São Tomé), Mozambique has displayed the smallest EMP during this 
period and, among the currency pegs (Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau), Cape Verde has done 
so. Apart from Mozambique, one can also see that EMP is greater in Managed floats than in 
Currency pegs. 
As for volatility, comparing among managed floats, we see that, not only has 
Mozambique shown a smaller EMP, but Mozambique has also a smaller volatility during the 
sample period, ranking this country as the most “financially sound” of all the managed floats 
involved here. In the group of the currency pegs, which, as expected, have much smaller 
volatility than the managed floats, Guinea-Bissau has a slightly smaller volatility than Cape 
Verde. 
3.3. EMP in ECOWAS 
The same analysis was, then, conducted for the whole of ECOWAS region. The purpose 
of this lies in finding out how well does Cape Verde fit in the region and, particularly, in 
ascertaining how well does Cape Verde compare to other currency pegs in the region, namely 
the CFA Franc region. Table 3a and b present a full country-by-country comparison of all the 
descriptive statistics in ECOWAS (Monthly EMP mean, maximum, minimum, median, 
unconditional volatility (standard deviation) and the number of Low, Moderate and High EMP 
crises) .The descriptive stats for Cape Verde as compared to the ECOWAS (Pegged and Float 
currency countries mean) and Nigeria are presented in Table 4. Nigeria was left out because 
                                                                                                                                                                              
descriptive statistics in the overall sample and in the number of crises estimated, but not for the 
magnitude of Guinea-Bissau’s EMP during crises situations. 
  8keeping it would make the average look excessively similar to Nigeria’s EMP. EMP in Cape 
Verde is very much in line with other fixers in the region, as is its volatility. Floaters in 
ECOWAS (Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Gambia) behave rather poorly when compared to 
the fixers such as the Franc CFA countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo). As for the severity of crises, Cape Verde has a good behavior 
overall, with no severe crises and a good performance in crises periods, outperforming even a 
number of fixers in the region. 
The evolution of these EMP and the corresponding standard deviations over time, 
displayed in Figures 10 and 11, also tells us that Cape Verde is very similar to other fixers in the 
region and that it is the floaters who have presented a rather dismal performance in the region. 
This may be a sign for the floaters in the region to integrate further and follow the example of 
the fixers. Finally, looking at the period since 1989, as done in Figures 2 and 3, in order to have 
a medium-run overview, we see that Cape Verde has behaved notoriously well in the past two 
decades, both against a fixer and against a floater from the region. 
3.4. EMP in SADC 
We turn now to Mozambique and its behavior inside SADC. We use Tables 5 a and b to 
show the descriptive stats for fixers and floaters, and Table 6 for a summed up view of the 
region as a comparison benchmark to Mozambique. As shown in table 6, Mozambique’s 
performance, which we have seen to be reasonably good compared to Angola is still good when 
compared especially to the floaters. Once again, we have to take the large country South Africa 
from the comparison; otherwise, our weighted average would give us virtually a comparison 
between Mozambique and South Africa. We also present a pegged currency, Seychelles. There 
are other pegs (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland), but since these peg to the South 
African rand, we think it will be more informative to compare with the Seychelles, that pegs to 
the dollar.
8 Nevertheless, as said earlier, a full country-by-country comparison of all the 
descriptive statistics in SADC (Monthly EMP mean, maximum, minimum, median, 
unconditional volatility (standard deviation) and the number of Low, Moderate and High EMP 
crises) was performed and is available in Table 5a and b. One can see that Mozambique mingles 
with the floaters with only slightly higher volatility and actually behaves better in terms of 
Mean EMP. Seychelles, of course, being pegged to the dollar, has a markedly smaller volatility. 
Analyzing Table 5b, we can see that Mozambique, although far from being the best of the group 
of the floaters inside SADC, performs rather well in the group: it has the third lowest mean and 
the third lowest standard deviation. 
                                                            
8 Zimbabwe through some of the sample period also pegs to the dollar, but it is quite different, given that 
huge devaluations occurred in 1998 and 2000. 
  9We can understand, by inspection of Figures 12 and 13 that Mozambique has performed 
similarly to other floaters but its volatility has converged to the volatility of Seychelles, a fixer. 
The fixers, when taken as a whole, behave very similarly to South Africa, given that some of 
those fixers are either pegged to the South African rand (Lesotho, Namibia) or they’re pegged to 
a basket of currencies where the South African rand has an overwhelming weight.
9 Interestingly 
enough, looking to a broader sample, from 1994 to 2008, as we do in Figures 4 and 5, we can 
see that although Mozambique’s EMP mean has behaved similarly to the one of South Africa, 
its volatility has converged more sharply towards the one of Seychelles, from 1999 on. Finally, 
coming back to Table 5b, we can see that Mozambique has a good performance in terms of the 
number and severity of crises (few crises, none of which severe), behaving better in this account 
than several economies in the region, such as Tanzania, Mauritius and Malawi. Actually, when 
we compare to a fixer such as Seychelles, although the mean EMP is higher, the number of 
crises is lower than Seychelles’, even if crises in Seychelles are smoother. 
4. Modeling EMP 
4.1. The model 
Having a deeper interpretation of the database we built in mind, we modeled EMP using 
an EGARCH-M model, described in Hamilton (1994). Autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH) models (see Engle (1982)) have been used extensively due to the 
possibility of modeling the mean and the conditional variance simultaneously through them 
Bollerslev (1986) extended Engle’s analysis by allowing the variance to follow an ARMA 
process, the variance would depending not both on lags of the squared residuals and on lags of 
itself. Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987) later included the variance in the process for the mean, 
thus introducing the ARCH-M or ARCH in mean. 
The base model we estimated has the following structure: 
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9 This is beyond the scope of this paper but it could be taken into account by analyzing explicitly the EMP 
of these currencies vis-à-vis the rand, although for Lesotho and Namibia this would require a redefinition 
of the index given that the exchange rate is fixed through the whole sample. For Botswana that is not 
required; computing this, we get for Botswana, a mean EMP of -0.2%, similar to the one we found vis-à-
vis the dollar and  an unconditional standard deviation of 4.9%, lower than the one we found vis-à-vis the 
dollar. Additional information could thus be extracted from a redefinition of the EMP for these countries. 
  10where denotes the real exchange rate, given by 
P
EP*
, where E stands for the exchange rate, P 
for the Consumer Price Index(CPI) in home country and P* for the benchmark country’s CPI. 
Domcredit gives the domestic credit in each country. 
  We depart from the basic structure as little as possible, but, whenever hypothesis testing 
pointed us that way, we added a further lag. Hence, in Tables 7 to 11,   stands for the 
coefficient in the mean of variation of lagged (one month) domestic credit and stands for the 
coefficient in the mean of variation of lagged (two months) domestic credit. The remaining 
notation follows the same reasoning.  
Occasionally, when needed, we add an MA representation to the mean equation and we 
sometimes use different distributions for zt  whenever we feel the data require us to do so 
(namely, if the presence of “fat tails” is so marked in the data that we are too far away from a 
Normal distribution, as a Jarque-Bera test is able to reveal). All series are stationary, as given by 
the Phillips-Perron unit root test. 
Our interpretation of the parameters is one of efficiency of the markets and perception 
of credibility of the policymakers in each country. 
Moving to the expected signs of the mean equation’s coefficients, we expect that a 
country where arbitrage works will be signaled by a negative variance coefficient ( ) which 
can be interpreted as a measure for risk-return relationship. This means that wherever EMP 
volatility is high, there should be a larger return as compensation, which will imply a lower 
EMP.  
For the conditional variance equation’s coefficients, the asymmetric shocks coefficient 
( ) adds a further degree of sophistication in that, if positive, “bad” shocks (positive error in 
EMP) would increase volatility more than “good” shocks, due to the risk perception. We 
consider this indicator, together with the risk-return relationship, as the key elements for 
credibility. This behavior is expected in countries with more trustful financial systems, as 
opposed to those that are underdeveloped and less sophisticated. The coefficients for the 
variation of foreign exchange reserves ( 3  ) and for the variation of the interest rate differential 
( 4  ) should come negative for a credible country: a country accumulating foreign reserves or 
increasing its interest rate should be able to reduce the volatility.  
In both mean and variance equations, the signs of the coefficients on the variation of 
domestic credit and real depreciation are hard to discern a priori, since there are plausible 
explanations for each possibility, depending on the perception of financial reputation. In the 
  11case of a credible financial system, an increase in domestic credit is not expected to create a 
bubble. The expansion of credit signals low EMP mean and volatility. In contrast, in non-
credible countries, spikes in domestic credit would cause EMP mean or volatility to rise. With 
respect to real depreciation, a credible country does not face financial pressure since economic 
agents will not expect an uncontrolled depreciation. Moreover, through improved 
competitiveness, demand for domestic currency would increase which would alleviate EMP. On 
the contrary, in a country whose financial structure is non-credible a real depreciation would 
generate speculation over future depreciation which would increase EMP. In conclusion, for a 
credible country we expect that coefficients for domestic credit variation and real depreciation 
are negative in our model, both in mean and variance equations. To facilitate the interpretation 
of results in Tables 7 through 11, values in green and bold mean that the coefficient is 
significant and meaningful for establishing the country’s credibility. Conversely, values in red 
and italics/underlined mean that the coefficient is significant but running contrary to what 
financial credibility would require, ie, it means that the coefficient indicates a feature typical of 
an economy with a reduced level of financial credibility. 
4.2. Estimating countries models 
As each and every one of the above mentioned criteria cannot be met by every model 
for every country, we took a more general approach and globally looked at the results. By doing 
this, we expected to be able to compare the countries, judging the financial credibility of each, 
thereby ascribing an institutional meaning to the model itself. 
Given that our main purpose was to establish comparisons between countries, the model 
to be estimated should be fairly similar across countries. Care was taken to estimate the model 
as parsimoniously as possible instead of defining a lag structure too specific for each country 
that would depend on the path followed while estimating the model and, given that significant 
differences would be allowed between countries, would render comparisons across different 
regressions somewhat debatable. This said, we must acknowledge that it would be impossible to 
estimate the exact same model for every country, so we kept ourselves some freedom in 
changing the specification inside some boundaries of reasonability. In this regard, the freedom 
allowed for the structure of the EGARCH models in Macedo et al. (2009) seems to us to lead to 
arbitrary results.  
This excessive freedom concerns not only the decision to include or exclude such 
deterministic terms as linear trends, but also the lag structure, which varies widely from country 
to country. Conversely, distorting the lag structure in order to force significance for all 
coefficients should not be a concern. As mentioned, we follow an alternative procedure. The 
basic tenet of the results, that Mozambique outperforms Angola in the major features associated 
  12with financial credibility, is valid here as it was in Macedo et al. (2009), even though the main 
difference in our results compared to Macedo et al. (2009) resides in the estimation for Angola.  
The strategy we adopted to estimate the EGARCH models went as follows. First, we 
looked at the correlogram of EMP to see if some suggestion of the number of lags could be 
extracted from there; then, we took care of seasonality in the data (since we had monthly data, 
this could be an issue, even though it is not likely to find seasonality in EMP, but it can appear 
in the real depreciation rate or even in the variation of reserves, as it did for a minority of the 
countries in our sample). Next, we estimated the model through maximum likelihood, using a 
Normal distribution to start with and, later, a t or GED with the number of degrees of freedom 
being treated as an estimable parameter whenever necessary (ie, when the Jarque-Bera test 
concluded for the non-normality of the residuals estimated with the maximization of the Normal 
Log-Likelihood); to check the quality of the model, the correlogram of the standardized 
residuals and the correlogram of the squared standardized residuals were analyzed, by means of 
the Ljung-Box Q test. Whenever the correlogram of the squared residuals displayed spikes, new 
lags were added to the ARCH and GARCH components of the model, never exceeding the 
number of three.  
To improve the quality of the model, we looked for time dummies suggested by the 
Inclán-Tiao (1994) test and we added dummies ourselves, whenever a significant event was 
known to have taken place for that economy at a certain point in time (this information was 
mostly derived from national sources, namely the Central Banks websites). In certain cases, 
there were outliers that were frustrating any attempt to estimate a meaningful model; in such 
cases, those outliers were taken care of using specific dummies; this was done after careful 
consideration and, to our view, only after exhausting any other way of correctly estimating the 
model.
10 
The estimation results for PALOP are presented in Table 7 while floaters and fixers are 
presented separately in Tables 8 through 11 respectively for ECOWAS and SADC (as 
mentioned, the values in green and bold mean that the coefficient indicates credibility, those in 
red and italics/underlined mean that the coefficient does not suggest credibility).  
Figures 14 through 21 plot EMP mean and volatility for the same groups, conditional on 
the model, to be discussed next.  
                                                            
10 We used EViews 5.1 and we employed the Marquardt nonlinear optimization algorithm (which is a 
numerical algorithm which may be seen as a combination of steepest descent and the Gauss-Newton 
method, being closest to steepest descent when far from the correct solution in order to assure 
convergence). We also had the care of using the robust standard errors (whenever estimating with a 
Normal distribution) by Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992), who note that the maximization of a poorly 
specified likelihood function (such as the Normal distribution with fat-tailed variables) would understate 
the standard errors while maintaining consistency. 
  135. Discussion of the results 
5.1. EMP in PALOP 
We can see, going through the results for our model that, among the Portuguese-
speaking countries (Table 7, Figures 14 through 17), Cape Verde is the one nation that displays 
the best set of results from all five. Guinea-Bissau results denote also a good behavior.  
For the risk-return relationship all Portuguese-speaking countries show significant 
negative coefficients apart from Angola, which shows a significant positive risk-return 
relationship. This represents the inability of Angola to respond to negative pressures with higher 
returns in order to compensate risk. This result is not surprising since Angola, as seen 
previously, faced the most severe crises among these countries which increase the difficulty to 
control them. 
For the impact of domestic credit in EMP variance ( 1  ), we can see that Cape Verde 
shows a strong negative relationship which indicates that this country is able to increase 
domestic credit while relieving the volatility of monetary pressure, a strong sign of credibility. 
However, São Tomé and Mozambique appear with a positive relationship that indicates the 
opposite of Cape Verde. It seems that these countries did not avoid the volatility and uncertainty 
on EMP with monetary expansions through domestic credit. But if we complement this result 
with the one obtained for the coefficient of domestic credit variation in the mean equation ( 1  ) 
for Mozambique we might conclude that this volatility is not so harmful given that  1   appeared 
negative, which tells us that Mozambique was able to reduce its EMP when credit was 
expanded, although they did not behaved so well in controlling the volatility. In Guinea-Bissau, 
credit expansions were also accompanied by a decrease in EMP. 
In respect to real depreciation coefficient 2  , we conclude EMP mean is negatively 
affected by a real depreciation in Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, a behavior that is a sign of 
credibility. Mozambique presents again the opposite scenario. A positive (lagged) real 
depreciation coefficient means that the initial real depreciation is followed by nominal 
depreciations, which will increase the EMP. This gives us a clue that Mozambique real 
depreciations are not credible and incite speculation. 
The asymmetric leverage effect appeared significant only in Cape Verde and Guinea-
Bissau. For the other Portuguese-speaking countries it seems that there isn’t difference between 
positive and negative shocks. For Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, the sign for the asymmetric 
effect appeared positive, which indicates that positive shocks in EMP (ie, negative pressures) 
  14have more impact on volatility when compared to negative shocks with the same magnitude. 
This behavior is usually connected to mature financial markets. 
One interesting fact about the equation for Angola is that the variation in the price of oil 
eases EMP, natural for an oil-producing country. Angola has also some degree of credibility 
through reserves
11. 
We can conclude that, in PALOP, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau show the most 
significant signs of credibility. Still, Mozambique and (in a less extent) São Tomé show also 
some positive signs. This cleavage between these countries is not unfamiliar with the fact that 
Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau are countries with pegged currency to the Euro, which makes 
them less vulnerable to speculative attacks contrasting with managed floating countries like the 
others within this group. 
5.2. EMP in ECOWAS 
We now look at the results for ECOWAS (Tables 8 and 9, Figures 18 and 19), 
distinguishing managed floats from fixed exchange regimes. Analyzing the graphs with 
conditional mean and volatility of ECOWAS groups, we can see that the fixers behave better 
than the floaters, assuming that low and stable EMP is required for classifying a country as 
credible. This is not a surprise since the computation of EMP is affected by the variation in the 
exchange rate, an infrequent observation in countries that peg their currency, like those in 
ECOWAS that peg their currency to the euro (some of them are in the CFA). 
Cape Verde not only has a good position inside Portuguese-speaking countries, but also 
within ECOWAS. If we compare Cape Verde to other fixers, we see that not only the 
asymmetric coefficient and risk-return relationship have the right signs of credibility but also 
other coefficients indicate the expected signs for a credible country while not all other countries 
do so. For instance, the negative sign of the interest rate differential variation indicates that 
Cape Verde’s policymakers are capable of reducing volatility of EMP when there is an increase 
of the interest rate differential. This behavior is similar to other peggers such as Benin, Guinea-
Bissau, Mali and Guinea. The rest of the group does not present evidence of a positive sign nor 
negative. All countries present the credible sign for the risk-return relationship, but not all of 
them show up with a positive asymmetric effect. Together with Cape Verde, a positive sign 
appears in Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Mali. Niger’s model provides no evidence for this 
sign and Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Togo show up with a negative asymmetric 
coefficient. 
                                                            
11 Other models for Angola, estimated while performing robustness analysis, detected this effect, while 
ascribing an ambiguous sign to the impact of the real exchange rate over volatility. The main features of 
the estimation, namely the positiveness of the variance coefficient in the mean equation and the absence 
of an asymmetric effect always held. 
  15Confirming the analysis of the descriptive statistics, the floaters in ECOWAS show 
worse results than the fixers. Only Liberia achieves the credible signs for risk-return 
relationship and asymmetric effect simultaneously. Nigeria achieves the correct sign for risk-
return relationship and Ghana has the negative asymmetric coefficient. All other countries fail 
on both indicators. Moreover, almost all other coefficients associated to each explanatory 
variable are either insignificant or significant but pointing to no credibility. Fixers, with Cape 
Verde as benchmark, are clearly more credible than floaters. 
5.3. EMP in SADC 
In SADC (Tables 10 and 11, Figures 20 and 21), the pattern is harder to discern than in 
ECOWAS. Nevertheless, nations usually regarded as institutionally sound have good results. 
The gap between fixers and floaters is not as wide in SADC as in ECOWAS. This occurs since 
some fixers in SADC are pegged to a basket of currencies that does not include the dollar and 
the euro, which are used as reference to compute the EMP. Therefore, they behave somehow as 
floaters, even if it is an indirect effect.  
Within those currencies pegged to a basket of currencies, Botswana (and Swaziland to a 
lesser degree) present the most credible signs for the risk-return relationship and the asymmetric 
effect (key indicators) and have also the right signs for the effect of interest rate differential in 
volatility. Namibia and Lesotho present the risk-return relationship that reveals no credibility as 
well as all other indicators, although Namibia has the correct asymmetric coefficient. The 
remaining fixers, Seychelles and Zimbabwe, are pegged to the dollar. Zimbabwe’s results are 
worse than Seychelles’, which is not surprising since they had strong devaluations in 1998 and 
2000. Seychelles presents strong evidence for credibility, since almost all coefficients point in 
that direction. 
In the SADC floaters group, we may conclude that Mauritius and South Africa comprise 
the most credible results on our key indicators, as well as other coefficients. However, as we 
discussed in Portuguese-speaking results, Mozambique has also some positive conclusions, as 
the risk-return relationship or the domestic credit effect on the EMP mean. Other countries 
present worse results, with only some positive indicators. 
In SADC we can conclude that Seychelles has the most credible policies. Nevertheless, 
there are some floaters with great credibility, such as Mauritius and South Africa and even 
Mozambique has conquered some. 
6. Conclusion and future research 
This paper has presented the development experiences of Cape Verde and Mozambique 
and has made a strong case of the success of their experiences. Either looking at the descriptive 
  16statistics (EMP Mean, EMP Volatility and the Severity of Crises occurring in each case) or at 
the econometric estimations, the conclusion remains that Cape Verde has had a remarkable 
degree of credibility and sophistication of its exchange markets, undoubtedly due to the quality 
of the institutional framework. This is not only true in the “WGI-sense” but also in a financial, 
“expectational” way. Due to its natural focus on political freedom and accountability, WGI 
probably overlooks the effect of such expectations. Mozambique, too, despite lagging behind 
Cape Verde, has also some good results, very much in line with other floaters in the region, and 
better in some accounts (namely, the absence of any severe crises, a conditional volatility close 
to a fixer’s and a risk-return effect pointing the right way unlike many other countries in the 
region). Much remains to be done, especially in Mozambique, where the credibility of 
policymakers is not as solid as in Cape Verde. Nevertheless, we believe to have uncovered leads 
that Mozambique is heading the right way. 
Also, for the rest of ECOWAS and SADC, other findings were uncovered. Generally 
speaking, SADC has higher EMP than ECOWAS. Also, and quite understandably, fixers have, 
generally, a better performance in terms of credibility than floaters. However, in SADC, those 
fixers pegged to the South African rand behave in a more erratic way, following the rand.  
In the future, we believe that a relevant research agenda can be drawn from this paper. 
Moving forward in both the descriptive and econometric parts, expanding the scope of 
econometric modeling from a single equation analysis to a multivariate one in order to establish 
the existence of connections between the degree of credibility in different countries, and 
upgrading the models to incorporate endogenous-switching whenever possible would deepen 
our understanding of financial credibility in these sub regions of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Table 1 a: Institutional characterization of Cape Verde versus ECOWAS, according to the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators 
 
Cape Verde versus ECOWAS 1996-2007 
   Cape Verde  ECOWAS 
Rule of Law  0.48  -0.75 
Voice and Accountability  0.65  -0.51 
Political Stability & Absence of Violence/Terrorism  0.96  -0.49 
Government Effectiveness  0.11  -0.77 
Regulatory Quality  -0.25  -0.65 
Control of Corruption  0.33  -0.67 




Table 1 b: Institutional characterization of Mozambique versus SADC, according to the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators 
 
 
Mozambique versus SADC 1996-2007 
   Mozambique SADC 
Rule of Law  -0.74  -0.44 
Voice and Accountability  -0.08  -0.30 
Political Stability & Absence of Violence/Terrorism  0.05  -0.24 
Government Effectiveness  -0.33  -0.38 
Regulatory Quality  -0.47  -0.45 
Control of Corruption  -0.65  -0.39 
Source: same as table 1a 
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Table 2: EMP mean, unconditional volatility per month and the number of EMP crises - 
Portuguese-speaking countries 
 
Descriptive Statistics(% per month) 
Country Angola  Cape  Verde  Guinea-Bissau Mozambique  São  Tomé 
Std. Deviaton  31.43% 1.65% 4.33% 4.85%  7.36%
Max  158.33% 5.55% 23.90% 13.15%  23.64%
Mín  -211.29% -7.39% -15.08% -23.86%  -27.21%
Mean  4.17% -0.09% -0.01% -0.18%  0.46%
Median  2.39% -0.04% 0.32% 0.27%  0.74%
          
EMP Crises Statistics 
Low 
EMP Mean  97.14% 3.65% 12.82% 11.64%  15.86%
EMP SD  42.90% 0.93% 7.02% 1.65%  3.81%
Crises  5 8 6 4  7
Moderate 
EMP Mean  122.55% 4.55% 18.32% 13.05%  23.64%
EMP SD  35.46% 0.87% 5.68% 0.14%  . 
Crises  3 3 3 2  1
High 
EMP Mean  140.12% .  21.21% .  . 
EMP SD  25.76% .  3.81% .  . 
Crises  2 0 2 0  0Table 3 a: Description of ECOWAS Fixed 
 
Descriptive Statistics(% per month)         




Bissau Niger  Mali  Senegal  Togo 
Std. Deviaton  1.85% 1.85% 1.65% 1.77% 7.77% 4.33% 1.76% 1.84% 1.79% 1.78%
Max  5.05% 4.74% 5.55% 5.06% 22.69% 23.90% 4.70% 4.26% 4.65% 4.66%
Mín  -7.58% -7.78% -7.39% -5.78% -34.39% -15.08% -6.96% -6.04% -6.33% -6.43%
Mean  -0.20% -0.11% -0.09% -0.14% -0.12% -0.01% -0.10% -0.21% -0.24% -0.12%
Median  -0.06% 0.00% -0.04% -0.04% 0.52% 0.32% 0.09% -0.13% -0.29% -0.04%
                 
EMP Crises Statistics 
Low 
EMP Mean  3.62% 3.50% 3.65% 3.68% 22.69% 12.82% 3.31% 3.58% 3.37% 3.88%
EMP SD  0.87% 0.60% 0.93% 0.75% .  7.02% 0.68% 0.57% 0.79% 0.89%
Crises  7 8 8 9 1 6 7 9 8 7
Moderate 
EMP Mean  4.77% 4.74% 4.55% 22.69% .  18.32% 4.70% .  4.59% 4.55%
EMP SD  0.40% .  0.87% .  .  5.68% .  .  0.08% 0.12%
Crises  2 1 3 1 0 3 1 0 2 3
High 
EMP Mean  . .  .  . .  21.21% .  . .  . 
EMP SD  . .  .  . .  3.81% .  . .  . 
Crises  0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
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Table 3 b: Description of ECOWAS Float 
Descriptive Statistics(% per month) 
Country Gambia  Ghana  Liberia  Nigeria 
Sierra 
Leone 
Std. Deviaton  7.19% 5.56% 11.63% 23.25% 8.61% 
Max  29.91% 27.95% 35.56% 138.91% 25.15% 
Mín  -22.65% -11.63% -33.05% -56.59% -26.95% 
Mean  0.87% 0.80% -0.57% -2.55% 0.64% 
Median  0.05% 0.84% 0.25% -4.30% 1.42% 
         
EMP Crises Statistics                
Low                
EMP Mean  17.02% 12.71% 22.64% 55.55% 18.92% 
EMP SD  5.98% 6.40% 6.11% 39.51% 3.18% 
Crises  88 8 7  6  
Moderate                
EMP Mean  22.72% 27.95% 35.56% 106.32% 25.15% 
EMP SD  6.23% . .  46.08%  . 
Crises  31 1 2  1  
High                
EMP Mean  29.91% 27.95% . 138.91%  . 
EMP SD  . .  . .  . 
Crises  11 0 1  0  
 
Table 4:  Description of Cape Verde, Nigeria, ECOWAS Floating currency countries (without 
Nigeria) and ECOWAS Pegged currency countries 
 ECOWAS       
   Cape Verde  Floating Currency Countries 
(Without Nigeria)  Nigeria  Pegged Currency 
Countries 
Mean  -0.09% 0.81% -2.55% -0.16%
Std. Deviation  1.65% 5.07% 23.25% 1.58%
Máx  5.55% 24.74% 138.91% 4.46%
Mín  -7.39% -10.76% -56.59% -6.33%
Median  -0.04% 0.73% -4.30% -0.07%
EMP Crises Statistics 
Low 
EMP Mean  3.65% 11.75% 55.55% 3.19%
EMP SD  0.93% 5.54% 39.51% 0.76%
Crises  8 8 7 9
Moderate 
EMP Mean  4.55% 19.30% 106.32% 4.17%
EMP SD  0.87% 7.70% 46.08% 0.41%
Crises  3 2 2 2
High 
EMP Mean  . 24.74% 138.91% . 
EMP SD  . .  .  . 
Crises  0 1 1 0
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Table 5 a: Description of SADC Fixed 
Descriptive Statistics (% per month) 
Country Botswana  Lesotho  Namibia  Seychelles  Swaziland Zimbabwe
Std. Deviaton  6.23% 7.67% 7.82% 2.61% 8.36% 11.43%
Max  17.81% 19.09% 30.69% 7.26% 35.21% 43.07%
Mín  -14.76% -21.13% -20.80% -10.72% -17.56% -35.15%
Mean  -0.06% -0.02% -0.06% -0.14% 0.22% 2.79%
Median  -0.43% -0.11% -0.29% -0.32% 0.43% 1.68%
         
EMP Crises Statistics  
Low  
EMP Mean  13.52% 15.32% 17.19% 5.30% 18.39% 30.36%
EMP SD  3.72% 2.44% 5.91% 1.04% 6.53% 9.3%
Crises  8 12 9 10 9 5
Moderate 
EMP Mean  17.54% .  26.21% 7.04% 35.21% 39.41%
EMP SD  0.25% .  6.35% 0.31% . 5.18%
Crises  3 0 2 2 1 2
High 
EMP Mean  . .  30.69% .  35.21% 43.07%
EMP SD  .  . . .  . .















 Table 5 b: Description of SADC Float 
  Descriptive Statistics(% per month)       
Country  Angola Madagascar  Malawi  Mauritius  Mozambique South Africa  Tanzania  Zambia 
Std. Deviaton  31.43% 6.51% 9.14% 3.91% 4.85% 9.24% 2.89% 8.74%
Max 158.33% 19.76% 38.59% 14.42% 13.15% 41.07% 12.95% 21.21%
Mín 
-
211.29% -18.63% -35.27% -14.77% -23.86% -25.31% -11.88% -30.47%
Mean 4.17% 0.27% 1.19% 0.33% -0.18% -0.45% 0.12% -0.65%
Median 2.39% 0.11% 1.49% 0.20% 0.27% -1.14% -0.01% 0.17%
               
EMP Crises Statistics 
Low 
EMP Mean  97.14% 15.25% 22.25% 10.12% 11.64% 29.17% 6.72% 18.19%
EMP SD  42.90% 3.11% 7.87% 3.21% 1.65% 10.45% 2.56% 2.61%
Crises 5 5 7 7 4 5 8 3
Moderate 
EMP Mean  122.55% 18.22% 38.59% 12.56% 13.05% 36.42% 12.95% 21.21%
EMP SD  35.46% 2.19% .  1.42% 0.14% 4.49% .  . 
Crises 3 2 1 4 2 3 1 1
High 
EMP Mean  140.12% .  38.59% 14.42% .  36.42% 12.95% . 
EMP SD  25.76% .  .  .  .  4.49% .  . 
















  28 Table 6:  Description of Mozambique, South Africa, Seychelles and SADC Floating currency 
countries (without South Africa) 
 
 SADC       
   Mozambique  Floating Currency Countries 
(Without South Africa)  South Africa  Seychelles - Pegged 
Currency Country 
Mean  -0.18% 0.60% -0.45% -0.14%
Std. Deviation  4.85% 4.27% 9.24% 2.61%
Máx  13.15% 14.37% 41.07% 7.26%
Mín  -23.86% -26.34% -25.31% -10.72%
Median  0.27% 0.42% -1.14% -0.32%
              
EMP Crises Statistics 
Low 
EMP Mean  11.64% 9.98% 29.17% 5.30%
EMP SD  1.65% 2.75% 10.45% 1.04%
Crises  4 7 5 10
Moderate 
EMP Mean  13.05% 13.65% 36.42% 7.04%
EMP SD  0.14% 1.03% 4.49% 0.31%
Crises  2 2 3 2
High 
EMP Mean  . .  36.42% . 
EMP SD  . .  4.49% . 















Table 7:  Portuguese-speaking countries table with the results of the Econometric Model 
  Angola     Cape Verde     Guiné-Bissau     Mozambique São  Tomé   
 0.0550 **  -0.0009 ** -0.0040 ** -0.0034 **  -0.0607 **
 0.0037    0.0034    -0.0158 ** -0.0126 *  0.0258   
 0.1703   -0.1664 ** -0.0697 *  0.7048 **       
Dummy 1  -0.0060  -0.0058 *  -0.0253 ** 0.0014     -0.0599 **
Dummy 2             0.0018            -0.0832 **
Dummy 3             0.0148 *             
varoil  -0.3135  **                        
                              
 0.0941   0.7830 ** 1.4495 ** 0.2048    -0.0533   
 -0.0621 **  -38.1824 ** 1.4939    1.5348 **  0.3569 **
 -0.5520    4.4542    -14.9006 ** -9.3070 **      
 -0.9679  *  -1.1800    2.1610 ** 3.6666    -0.7767 * 
 0.0069   -7.5390 ** -48.6304 ** 0.1895 **  0.9616 **
Dummy 1  -0.0057   -1.8273 ** -0.3880    0.3010    -2.4759 **
Dummy 2              0.1202          0.3873   
Dummy 3              1.2355 **            
                  
varoil  -0.9631                           
Loglikelihood  61.9993    386.3900    279.4219    260.4622    179.1957   
ARCH effects 
(F- 1 lag)  0.2536    0.8406    0.8341    0.6555    0.6711   
Distribution  t-distribution    t-distribution   t-distribution   Normal    Normal   




(liberalization)        May 97  
96to98; 
05and06    December 97   
Dummy 2           2000 to 2003         June 2001   
Dummy 3          
OctAgo96, 
Oct00, Dec03            
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level. 
values in green and bold mean that the coefficient indicates credibility 
values in red, italics and underlined mean that the coefficient indicates no credibility 
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Table 8:  ECOWAS Floating currency countries table with the results of the Econometric Model 
 
   Gambia     Ghana     Liberia     Nigeria     Sierra Leone  
  0.0041  **  0.0439 **  -0.0396 ** -0.0762  **  0.0330 **
        -0.1312          0.1945  **   
                           
  0.3943  **  0.1071          -0.0515  **   
  -0.0059                       
Dummy 1  0.0004           0.0636 ** 0.0897  **  -0.0656 **
Dummy 2  -0.0093  **        3.8215 ** 1.2216  **    
AR(1)              -0.2420 **         
            
  -0.0017     0.2805 **  0.8074 ** 0.1527     0.1594  
        1.4768          3.3505  **    
                            
        1.0617          1.8107       
                            
  -2.0145     1.8684 **  1.8549 ** 3.1888  **  -0.4521  
  -3.8048           -0.3999            
  0.0847     -0.0319    -0.4090    -0.0739     0.3519 **
  0.0531           0.3046            
Dummy 1  1.0135  **        0.2142    0.1390     0.9066 **
Dummy 2  0.3761  **        -3.1690 ** -3.5261       
                                
Loglikelihood  188.3794     205.2405    -23.7940    52.2117     151.7575   
ARCH effects 
(F test- 1 lag)  0.6302     0.8367 **  0.2030    0.1565     0.8155   
Distribution  Normal     Normal     Normal     Normal     Normal    
                                
Dummies  Jan04 on           War 99-03     2001 on    
War (up to 
May 02)    
  
Jan99-
Dez03           January 98     Jan-99          
                              
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level. 
values in green and bold mean that the coefficient indicates credibility 





 Table 9:  ECOWAS Fixed currency countries table with the results of the Econometric Model 
 
 
   Benin 
 Burkina 
Faso   Cape Verde  Côte d'Ivoire  Guinea  Guinea-Bissau Mali  Níger  Senegal  Togo 
 -0.0475 **  -0.0007  ** -0.0009 ** -0.00215 ** -0.0082 ** -0.004  **  -0.1957 ** -0.002785 **  -0.005529 **  -0.001 ** 
             0.0034                -0.0158  *                         
                                                            
 1.2175 **  -0.0525  ** -0.1664 ** -0.27075          -0.0697  *  6.89313    0.105318 **  -0.299652    -0.0415   
       0.1108  **                               0.366375 **  -0.337672         
Dummy 1        -0.0678     -0.0058 *  0.006235 ** -0.3329 ** -0.0253  **        -0.061456 **  -0.023168 **  0.0031 ** 
Dummy 2        -0.0832           -0.04277 **       0.0018           -0.015161 **  -0.053739 **  -0.0623 ** 
Dummy 3                                0.0148  *              -0.00404         
                                
 0.2 **  -0.4528  ** 0.783 ** -0.86022 ** -0.6989 ** 1.4495  **  0.0599 ** -0.060582    0.364938 *  -0.3292 ** 
             -38.1824 **             1.4939                            
                                                            
 27.9139 **  -5.7537     4.4542    -23.3573          -14.9006  **  34.5568 ** 32.08057 **  10.69427    -1.5759 ** 
       -24.1059  **                               9.747359    -36.46947         
 0.626 **  -9.352  ** -1.18    -4.58738 ** -8.4016 ** 2.161  **  0.50117 ** -0.547593 **  -4.685375    35.2173 ** 
       -2.7954  **                               1.218201 **  -3.45251         
 -3.8093 **  -3.8173     -7.539 ** 9.368822    -0.1896 ** -48.6304  **  -1.25017 ** 0.303105    2.055358    -0.8836   
       -2.5543                                   -7.629225 **  -2.218094         
Dummy 1        -4.8638  ** -1.8273 ** 1.034221 ** -0.642    -0.388           -1.406229 *  -2.172968 **  -0.8273 ** 
Dummy 2        -3.7776  **       -1.28689          0.1202           -1.057447 **  0.084066    1.4626 * 
Dummy 3                                1.2355  **              0.603512         
                                
Loglikelihood  335.925    363.935     386.39    364.9803    103.427    279.422     339.272    398.223    359.3746    361.998   
ARCH effects 
(F test- 1 lag)  0.1558 **  0.1907     0.8406    0.634044    0.4574    0.8341     0.80013    0.690265    0.890765    0.9329   
Distribution  Normal     Normal     t     t     Normal     t     Normal     Normal     GED     Normal    
                                                          
Dummies        Oct02     January 








         Dez-03               2000-03             99 on    Jul96, Ago97, 
Ago98, Oct02 
96 (jan,feb) 
and Oct 02 




                2002 on         
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level.  values in green and bold mean that the coefficient indicates credibility. Values in red, italics and underlined mean that the 





















32 Table 10:  SADC Floating currency countries table with the results of the Econometric Model 
   Angola Madagascar Malawi Mauritius  Mozambique South  Africa Tanzania Zambia 
 0.055 **  -0.017 **  -0.0005 ** -0.0185 **  -0.0034 **  -0.0762 **  0.0077 ** 0.0267 **
 0.0037                0.4388 **  -0.0126 *  0.1684    0.0843 ** -0.0823   
 0.1703                                             
      0.4 **  0.3307 ** -0.0586    0.7048 **  0.5033 **  -0.03    0.064   
                                                
Dummy 1  -0.006          0.0316 ** -0.0006    0.0014    0.2459 **  0.03         
Dummy2                                      -0.0587 **      
varoil  -0.3135 **                                           
                                                 
 0.0941    -0.1343    -1.5061 ** 0.5996 **  0.2048    0.521 **  0.3789 ** -0.7896   
 -0.0621 **             23.5129 **  1.5348 **  5.9906    -7.8031 ** 5.538   
                                                
 -0.552    9.5422 **  -9.5753 ** -17.8716    -9.307 **  -4.1793 **  -21.3745 ** 9.9867   
                                                
 -0.9679 *  -9.8338 **  -3.9787 ** 19.3079 ** 3.6666     2.8716 **  1.6613    -1.5247   
                                                
 0.0069    0.4415 **  0.3875 ** -0.3915    0.1895 **  -0.6138 **  -0.1085    1.1971 **
                                                
Dummy 1  -0.0057          -0.8586    0.6398    0.301    3.3442 **  0.9819         
Dummy 2                                      -8.8016 **      
varoil  -0.9631                                           
                                               
Loglikelihood  61.9993    140.212    172.5847    270.525    260.462   171.75    322.94    100.03   
ARCH effects  
(F test - one lag)  0.2536    0.2336    0.842    0.836    0.6555   0.6499    0.8115    0.5417   
Distribution  t-distribution    Normal    
t-
distributi
on     GED     Normal     Normal   Normal    GED  
Dummies 
May05 on 
(liberalization)    1998 on 
Jan97, Nov 98, 
Jun00-Dez00 
96to98; 
05and06   
Apr 1996, 
1998 Jun and 
Aug-Oct) July97 
                        
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level. 
values in green and bold mean that the coefficient indicates credibility 
values in red, italics and underlined mean that the coefficient indicates no credibility 
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Table 11:  SADC Fixed currency countries table with the results of the Econometric Model 
   Botswana Lesotho  Namibia  Seychelles  Swaziland  Zimbabwe 
 -0.0748 ** 0.0375 ** 0.1262 ** -0.0027  **  -0.3291 *  0.014466 **
 0.0175    -0.0047 ** -1.8548 ** 0.0601     0.3352         
 0.0328                                 
 0.6878               0.4284  **  -0.1248         
 1.1808                                 
Dummy 1  0.0254 **             -0.0073  **        -0.209508   
Dummy 2                                0.153296   
Dummy 3                                0.122121   
                   
 0.2582 ** 0.0299    0.1276 ** 0.863  **  0.0735 ** 0.289713 **
 0.0777    0.1521 ** 20.4684 ** -2.5687  **  1.1998 **      
 0.4996 **                              
 3.4987                -20.3369 **  -1.5302         
 11.559 **                              
 0.7644    -0.7605    1.9436 ** 2.1137  **  -0.3868    0.001072   
 -2.3586                                 
 -1.2752 ** -0.0801    0.4405 ** -0.7534  **  -0.1474 ** -0.013408   
 -0.0554                                 
Dummy 1  0.2459                -0.3112  *        -3.534798   
Dummy 2                                -0.294489   
Dummy 3                                -3.095638   
                                      
Loglikelihood  215.12    156.641    170.552    303.012     156.6894    97.83333   
ARCH effects   
(F test - one lag)  0.9141    0.9785    0.9535    0.1046     0.8336    0.733719   
Distribution  Normal     Normal     Normal     Normal     Normal (q-max)     Normal    
                                      
Dummy 1   Feb 99                  2004 
(autonomy)           2001   
Dummy 2                           devaluation in 1998 
Dummy 3                                devaluation in 2000 
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level 
values in green and bold mean that the coefficient indicates credibility 
















































































































Country Appendix 1: Benin 
 
       
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                        Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Euro      
 
       













Mean       -0.001978
Median   -0.000630
Maximum   0.050534
Minimum -0.075844
Std. Dev.    0.018459
Skewness   -0.379499




Exchange Market Pressure histogram  
  46Country Appendix 2: Burkina Faso 
 
       
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                      Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Euro      
 
      












Mean       -0.001117
Median    4.46e-05
Maximum   0.047371
Minimum -0.077754
Std. Dev.    0.018478
Skewness   -0.860891
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Country Appendix 3: Cape Verde 
      
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                       Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Euro      
 
      















Mean       -0.000931
Median   -0.000381
Maximum   0.055536
Minimum -0.073892
Std. Dev.    0.016522
Skewness   -0.591091
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  48Country Appendix 4:  Côte d’Ivoire 
      
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                      Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Euro      
 
      














Mean       -0.001415
Median   -0.000421
Maximum   0.050592
Minimum -0.057835
Std. Dev.    0.017726
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  49Country Appendix 5: Gambia 
      
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                        Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Euro      
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  50Country Appendix 6: Ghana 
      
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                      Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Euro      
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 Country Appendix 7: Guinea 
      
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                      Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Euro      
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Median    0.005236
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Minimum -0.343862
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Country Appendix 9: Guinea-Bissau 
      
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                      Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Euro      
 
      












Mean       -0.000107
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Minimum -0.150758
Std. Dev.    0.043349
Skewness    1.668190
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Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                      Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Euro      
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Std. Dev.    0.116281
Skewness    0.004983
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  54Country Appendix 10: Mali 
      
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                      Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Euro      
 
      













Mean       -0.002057
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Skewness   -0.044221
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Country Appendix 11: Niger 
      
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                      Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Euro      
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  56Country Appendix 12: Nigeria 
       
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                      Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Euro      
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  57Country Appendix 13: Senegal 
      
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                      Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Euro      
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  58Country Appendix 14: Sierra Leone 
     
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                      Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Euro      
 
      













Mean        0.006373
Median    0.014159
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Std. Dev.    0.086081
Skewness   -0.596511
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  59Country Appendix 15: Togo 
      
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                      Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Euro      
 
       












Mean       -0.001202
Median   -0.000416
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Minimum -0.064286
Std. Dev.    0.017819
Skewness   -0.115186








  60Country Appendix 16: São Tomé and Principe  
      
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                      Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Euro      
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Minimum -0.272134
Std. Dev.    0.073641
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  61Country Appendix 17: Angola 
     
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                      Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Dollar     
 
      











Mean        0.041700
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Std. Dev.    0.314297
Skewness   -1.005968









Country Appendix 18: Botswana 
      
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                      Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Dollar     
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Country Appendix 19: Lesotho 
      
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                      Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Dollar     
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Country Appendix 20: Madagascar 
      
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                      Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Dollar     
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Country Appendix 21: Malawi 
      
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                      Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Dollar     
 
       












Mean        0.011894
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Std. Dev.    0.091376
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Country Appendix 22: Mauritius 
      
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                      Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Dollar     
 
      












Mean        0.003333
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Skewness    0.286358
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Country Appendix 23: Mozambique 
      
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                      Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Dollar     
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Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                      Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Dollar     
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Country Appendix 25: Seychelles 
 
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                                        Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Dollar     
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Country Appendix 26: South Africa 
      
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                                            Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Dollar     
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Country Appendix 27:Swaziliand 
      
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                              Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Dollar     
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Country Appendix 28: Tanzania 
   
Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                                      Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Dollar     
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Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                        Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Dollar     
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Exchange Market Pressure, monthly evolution                                      Exchange Rate Nominal Currency per Dollar     
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